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America's Health Care
System: The Reagan Legacy
TFI.RR COMBS-ORME AND BERNARD GUYER
John Hopkins University

li'anse'of the doinace o" lht private sector in health care in the United

Slates, health conditions an' notl as susceptible to cuangrs in public pliy as they are in other Western countries. low'ever, he elderly and!
youplg children are direct.ii affected by the federal gon'rmntent's health
can- piolicies and while hoth gro)s were the focus (if major changes
introduced by the Reagan adminisiration, these changes w.ere opposed
buy Congress. Nevertheless, changes in health care f(unding and adminisra ire arrangements have hail a negative impact on the needy and,
in addition, they have ben exacerbated by the Reagan admiistration°s
wider social and economic poli'cis which tave cantriln ted negatively to
th' health conditions of ithe
poor.

Analyzing the effect of the Reagan Administration upon the
American heath care system is a challenging task. The subject
is not health itself, but rather specific public health care policies
and programs. Health as it is conventionally defined is relatively
insensitive in the short run to political influence, due largely to
the multiplicity of personal and societal factors that influence
the health of individuals and groups, and the incremental effects
of these factors on health, Many of the traditional indicators of
health, such as infant mortality, for example, change slowly;
important trends can be seen only over long periods of time.
Also, most health care interactions occur in the private sector
(Litman, 1990), and under limited, if significant, government
influence.
There are two important exceptions to this generalization:
the elderly and low-income women and children, two groups
who are called "dependent" by Preston (1984) due to the fact
that they are not part of the work force and are largely supported by that work force. It is within these two groups that
the effects of governmental policy are most evident; this analysis
63
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focuses on low-income mothers and children, the 1105 dulndent (f these two groups,

This paper analy7es hit' Reagan effect on

Arerican ii,lii

care by first describing he Reagan agenda and- aciorm, hY ihe
Ad mi nist ra Lion. Next we assess early reactions by hei lith advocates, ;nd finally we exanint' it, immediate and ll)g,-trn
effects of the Reagan Administration's actions on th Anirican
health cdre system.
The Reagan Proposals For Health Carh,
It is notable that the Reagan speeches do not contain refert'llC
to a "health agenda"; lvallh apparently was not a ta iiipaign issue nor a major parl tf lit' "Reagan revolUliion' except
as it concerned the financinpg of liealth care. Greenherg (19'80)
noted that "Health policy, in faci, was barely touched tin in Ihev
campaign" (p. 1542). Davis nted in 1981: "The mosi si riking
ol
gap in the Reagan Administration heialth policy is tialilt'
any pusitiv agenda to address pressing problenis inhiI' health
care suctor" (p. 328). Indeed, in one of the PresideIII'S Iew direl coniments on health in a speech an the annual invting cf
the American Medical Associatiln (June 23, 1983), tit I'resident
concentrated on health financing ralher than heallh itself:
Health care cost are conIulmilg a growing pti:Iitin or hlit Natiin's
wNeailth, and that is wealt h that cannot be spo tlon vdiicul in ir
housing or other social needs ... It", high time that we pot hellih
cal' costs uinder the knife and ct iway the wash' and inlliit'licv.
(r. 907--90(8)

lie also reiterated a traditional, and arguable, corst'rvalive
position:
We' have the best health care in the world, because ii has rein.iincd
private (p. 908).

The health-related issme tlat did dominate Ihe Reagan campaign was abortion, althou.h it was cast not as a health issue
but as a moral one. There is no tiiut that Reagan presented
himself as opposed to ahtolin. I-Ie sted this ptsition during the Presidential campaign arid courted support fromi [Ile
pro-Iife movement. Early on inhitl' Ad ministration, lie sintud
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his pusilii on abortion hill did not support a conslititioillal
ame intnil to ban aborlini:
Nmw, I happen to have I.liieved and stated many lint"' 1ha I
believe in an abortion we arte takig a hunman life. But if this is 0t,1t
determined, then tleTr isn'I really any need for an a11(lu10t1,
herause once you have delt-rmined Ihis, (he CoiStilltiml alrealy
protecds the right to hirman lif'. (NIarch 6,1987, p.212)

Nathan and colleagus (1987) summarize the lrt'eminent
goal of (he Reagan Administralion as retrenchment in so.al
policy in (he broad sense. 'lowaIrd Ihis end, the Adminisralic '
proposed a new philosophy of government, his New lederalism, and economic renewal initiatives as operaliOali>zed by
reductions in spending.
New I t'crralis'n
Reagan made his viws on tlit role of governnni knovoi
at the rnnent of his inati1lurntl address, January 21, 1981, calling gl.'rvImen t the problem ralher then the solhlit n: "It is

timeu to check and revt'rse Ilie growth of governmnent, which
shows signs of having grown beyond (ie consent of (lie governed" (p. I). These comments and the proposals that followed
focused on the Federal government, although Nat lln (1987)
raises evidence to indicate tha he
it Administration intendtd lo

achieve retrenchment at all levels of government. ''e R'agan
analysis concluded thatl titraI government had grown I yond
tile inlenl of tile Constitition. 1 his growth in the size ald role
of the Fede ral Administration was attributed to Itie inflfunces

of special interest groups till lhe Congress. The ('ollstiIutional
argumenlt led the Administralion to propose lit, siralegy of
returning powers and responsibilily to the states: "II is iy inlention to curb the size and influence: of the Federal establishment

and to lemand recognitioi ohf
tlhdistinct ion betwe t Ilhe 1owers granted to the Federal Goverinment and those reserved to
the Stlt, or to the people" (January 20, 1981, Ii. 2).
BIock (;r

siI

The vehicle for implenenting
the

New Federalism (devolv-

in; p'ower to thle states) was to lt, block grants, Iniinp.-smns of
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money designated for broa lIv defined pitrposes t) Le speinl .c-

cording to the needs of the individual stales. Block grants had
their beginnings in 1966, when nine formula grants for various health programs (denial health, tuberculosis, etc.) wVre

combined into the Partnership in I leaith Act. The principle
that guided government's involvement in its citi/viis' health
as the Reagan Administralion assuiamed power originated with
the Sheppa rd-Fowner Act in 1921 and res1ulILed ill Ile ]tedhral
grants-in-aid s;ystem that was instittiionialied in thv Social Se-

curilv Act in 1935. Tille V of the Act was Ilie vehicle through
which the Federal government funded services to mothers and
children, through grants-in-aid Io tle stales on a matching basis. An enormous niumber of calegorical programs developed
over the years, creating a patch-work system of health tnre.
Now President Reagan proposed consolidating till or part of
83 of these categorical heallh programs intoi six human-service
block grants of $11 billion, claiming that the categorical programs burdened th0 states with regulations and paperwork:
Ineffective targeting, wasteful administrative overhead--all can be
eliminated by shifting the resources and dht ision-mniking authorilV to hcal and Stale government. This will also consolidale programs which are scattered throughomut the I lerd' bureiiaIcrcy,
hringing government closer to the peolh' and saving $23.9 billion
over the next 5 years. (February 18, 1981, p. III)
The earliest objective of the Administralion was 1o criate a
single health care block grant in which all if [he discretionary,
categorical Federal health v'are programs would be inocludedl. 10
implement this proposal, hotwever, required agreement frIom a
large number of congressional conmmiitees that had ii risd i ion
on various pieces of legislation. Important Cungressional laders like Robert Dole (Republican of Kansas), who chaired the
Senate Finance Committee and had jurisdiction ov.r all of the
Social Security Act p-rogram1s, would not relinquish any aulithority. Thus, Congressional opposition led to legislation for four
block grants. These were: the alcohol, drug abuse and cornmunit.y men!.al health grant;the preventive health svivices grant;
the community health centers grant; and the Maternal and Child
Health (MCI t) Services Block Grant (glehart, 1983).
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The MCI I Block (;rant consolidaled seven previous calgorical programs: the basic MCH program (which provided
maternity and infant health care and pediil1ric services), ('rippled Children's Services, special services for disabled children
receiving SUpplcmenll Security Income, lead-based painlt lisoning prevention, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome service',, genetic screening and counseling services, lienophilia truatnent
services, and the adolescent pregnancy programin.
"rhe legislation to implemntiithe block grants was carefully
crafted. The Administration had done a hmendous amount ft
homework to identify all the relevant pieces of legislation and
the corresponding citations and cross referunces to dhe health
legislation. In addition, they carefully identifie'd all tof the regulations attached to these laws as Ile regulalions were oflen
highly prescriptive.
The legislative vehicle for enacling the block grant consolidations was the Omnilbus BudgRet Recknciliatin Act. Lsing; this
process, the Administration was sniumltaneously able to circumvent lhe process of Congressional hearings and debate and at
the same time, achieve the budget reductions. David Stockumin,
the )irector of the Office of Manage'ment and Budlet, was able
to use te re'conciliation process in Congress to evade the powers of the nppropriations comrnillees and introduce program
changing legislation through the budget till. That roced.)1)t'tllre?
has dominated Federal policy-making ever since and introduced
the acronym, OIBRA (The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act),
into the Ailerican political lxicon. (The must recen( Congress
enacted a new budgetary vehicle called "pay-as-you-go" lhat
replaces 013RA (Congressional Quarterlv, P1990).)
In addition to crealion of the block grants, the Admini.,rlation made changes in Medicaid that enhanced slates' abilities
to limit benefits. Medicaid isa parlnership between tlhe Federal
government and tihe states, with stales pernitted to sot eligibility standards and reimbursement levels within hroad Federal guidelines. Changes in 1981 permitted stales to negotiate
rates of reimbursement rather than pamying "usual and cusltomary" rates, and allowed stat's to assign recillitnts li)providers
inslead of selecting the providers of their choice (Nathan &
Doolittle, 1987).
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1leregulaliui
As part of devolving power down to it,stateIhlvel and
restructuring' the Federal role in tlhe funding of pr,,,rams, the
Reagan Administration sought specifically 1t)
reduce regutlation.
The regulatory aspects of heallh care seern ti have been inibedded in a more fundam1ental assessment f government regulations as interfering with [lie competitive forces of 1himarket
place. And on this issue the Administralion had donet its honiework; in a February speech, President Reagan already knew the
number of pages of law and regulations lhal would le reduced
by block grants and deregulation:
In the health and social services area alon, tie plan wv.'r, proposing will substantially reduce lhe need for ,165 pages of liw, 1,401
pages of regualilns, 5,000 Federal eniployevs who presently administer 7,600 st.parate grants in about 25,tl00lt separate, location,.
Over 7 million man and wlman hours (f work by Stale and local
officials are required to fill owil governmeiil forms. (Febriary 18,
1981, lp. 11.1)
In the case of health care, however, the drive Lo deregulate
was tempered somewhat by ihe self-interest of the Federal government in reducing its massive health care expenditures. The
Administration believed that competition would reduce health
care costs (January 27, 1987, p.7)), and tiled the experience of
the Carter Administration in Irying to reduce the expansion of
health care costs [Iihrough regulation. Cerlificates of Need and
other cost containment strategies were generally seen as failures,
although evaluation data were scarce and could be interpreted
as showing some slowing of the expansion of hospital capital
costs ()divis, 1981). Reagan introduced the conservative notion
of treating health care as a commodity and using competition
in the market place as the vehicle for reduced expendiltures.
One case involving Federal regulations illustrates the President's tendency to approach social policy issues through anecdotes and his preference to address theni through personal
intervention. Early in the Adninistration, lie learned of the
plight of Katie Beckett:
Thu incident of just a few clays ago thai I know youi're all aware,
of--that almost accidentally caame to our alention--of 1he little
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3 1/2-year-old girl who had never lived at home with her parents
and couldn't, actually, because of a regulation with regard to the
government grant they had to have for medical exptnses of 10
to 12 thousand dollars a monili. And Dick Schweiker fond out
within 24 hours after we made it public that, by golly, he could
change that regulation and got it changed. And I had the pleasure
of calling those parents and speaking to them and their mispeakable happiness that the fact that (heir little girl was going to comle
home. (November 18, 1981, p. 1072)
Katie Beckett was a child with serious chronic lunIg dis-

ease owing to premalure birth and resulting in dependence
on an artificial respirator. She spent much of her youn, life in
hospital. Under the SSI-DCP (Supplemental Security IncomeDisabled Children's Program), Katie was eligible for SS benefits and Medicaid while hospitalized. The Blecketts, an educated
family, wanted to take Katie Iione and take care of her with
home-based technology. Were this to happen, however, Katie
would no longer be eligible for SSI and Medicaid because her

parents' income would be counted. Despite the fact thatithe
government could have saved thousands (if dollars in expensive hospital costs, they would not provide Medicaid to Katie
once she went home.
This little case-you know an example of what we're trying to cutre
is this one that, God bless them, Dick Schw,iker grabled a hold
after I made it piblic the other day of the little girl out in lowa, and
how quickly we made this change Tb think that our governmentand I was wxrong; I had old-fashioned figures when I sdid S6,0U0.
It was costing between $10,00) and $12,011 a month for Medicaid,
and even (lie doctors said she should be home, that she'd be better
off at home, and it would cost $1,000 a month at hone. But that
was more than her family could afford, so thev couldn't take; her
home because they couldn't lake over the cost, But here was the
government shelling out $10,000 or $12,000 every oillnth, when
a silly regulation stood in the way of them getting it for $1,000
a month. Dick found a way it ignore that, make an exception to
.that regulation, bul you wonder how many more cases are out
there in the country like that. (November 11), 1981, p. '1076)
The President's decision, of course, was correct. The policy
was foolish and short-sighted. However, rather than undertake
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a comprehensive reform of the way-Medicaid, SSI and other
Federal programs for the disabled interacted to create disincentives to appropriate care, Reagan preferred to solve the single
dramatic case. Regulations were subsequently written to allow
states to seek Medicaid waivers in tile cases of other ventilatordependent children.
Reductions in Spending
Asthe 1970s drew to a close with steep increases in the cost
of health care and rising Medicaid and Medicare expenditures,
cost containment was the major by-word. Federal efforts to curtail health care costs had been evident in efforts by Presidents
Nixon, Ford, and Carter in the 1970s to set limits on reimbursements to hospitals and physicians (Aaron & Schwartz, 1984).
Further efforts were made by state governments (l3ovbjerg &
Holahan, 1982). Thus when President Reagan assumed command in 1981 cost containment as already a major heath care
issue, and much of the focus was on the cost of the Medicaid
and Medicare programs.
Two areas were prime targets for spending reductions: the
entitlement :programs of Medicaid and Medicare, and tile new
block grants' The powerful lobbying arm of senior citizen
groups made Medicare (Title 18 of the Social Security Act, enacted in 1965) less of a target than Medicaid. Moreover, Medicare, which financed medical services for the elderly, enjoyed
wide popular support, in part due to its image as an insurance
program, in contrast the Medicaid, which was viewed as welfare. Nevertheless huge Medicare expenditures were a major
concern of the Administration's as they had been of previous
administrations. Doomsayers predicted the complete collapse of
the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and the Medicare program
itself (McCarthy, 1988). As a result, Public Law 98-21, the Social
Security Amendments of 1983 were enacted to limit Medicare
spending.
The new legislation limited spending by creating a system
of prospective payments to hospitals based upon a system of
categorizing all diagnoses into 383 Diagnosis Related Group
(DRG) categories with preset reimbursement levels. Certain adjustments were made to the payments made based on location
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of hospitals (urban vs. rural), and local differences in wage rates.
Although hospital costs for the Medicare population nonetheless continued to rise, DRGs did result in reduced admissions
and lengths of stay for the Medicare papulation (Dougherty,
1989). Although the effects of the DRG system .on the quality of care for the elderly are more difficult to ascertain, many
physicians feel that pressures on physicians to reduce costs
are resulting in patients being discharged "quicker and sicker"
(Dougherty, 1989).
Medicaid (Title 19 of the Social Security Act, also enacted in
1965), which financed health care for certain categories of poor
persons who were believed to lack access, to care, was originally almost a tack-on to Medicare and was generally believed
to be quite unimportant. It was a Federal grant-in-aid program,
with the amount of Federal match (between 50 and 801%) being
higher for states with lower per-capita incomes. The popularity
of Medicare lay in part in its image as an insurance program,
in contrast with Medicaid, which was viewed as "welfare."
The Federal government had become a major payor of
health care costs through Medicare and Medicaid; the two programs accounted for more than 39% of all Federal health care expenditures in 1980 (U.S. Health Care Financing Administration,
1988). Because Medicaid and Medicare are entitlement programs
(open-ended, and all eligible persons must receive included services), Administration objectives to reduce Federal taxing and
spending had to be met through mechanisms other than restructuring to block grants. (On the other hand, Nathan and Doolittle
(1987) maintain that Reagan hoped to restructure Medicaid to
a functional block'grant.)
Thus, claiming that the program was not cost-effective, the
President proposed: ", . . to put a cap on how much the Federal
Government will contribute, but at the same time allow the
States much more flexibility in managing and structuring the
programs (February 18, 1981, p. Ill).
There was an early proposal to swap Federal and state responsibilities for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and Medicaid (State of the Union, January 26, 1982,
p. 76). Under this plan, the Federal government would ha'Ve assumed all the costs for Medicaid while the states made
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welfare-AFDC-an entirely state program. Legislation to implement the idea was never proposed, perhaps due in part to opposition by the National Governors' Association (Iglehart, 1983).
In the 1981 OBRA, the Administration reduced spending
in t'wo ways. First., the eligibility level for AFDC was reduced.
Thus in 1982, at the end of a recession with increasing poverty, there were 597,000 fewer recipients of AFDC than there
had been in 1980 (U. S. Social Security Administration). Because
AFDC conveys automatic eligibility for Medicaid, these women
and childreri'also lost their health Insurance. After a decade of
improvements in access to health care for low-income women
and children, advocates feared reversals.
In fact, some reversals did occur-In prenatal care utilization,
for example Low-incoxne and'minarity womni, who do not
generally receive the same level of prenatal care during pregnancy as more advantaged women, but whose risks for poor
pregnancy outcome are greater, made significant improvements
during the 1970s.that.generally were attributed to Medicaid and
Federal Maternal and Child Health programs (Davis & Schoen,
1981). As Figure 1 shows, these gains were partially lost in the
1980s, although of course it is not possible to demonstrate conclusively why this occurred. Health advocates.were particularly
concerned that no progress was made in improving prenatal
care for black women.
It was in the area of lost benefits that the President's greatest
image problem plagued him. The President played on the old
American notion of a truly needy class and the existence of.a
safety net of supports to meet their basic needs. The net was
intended to prevent the undeserving poor, the working and
able-bodied poor, from benefiting:
We will continue to fulfill the obligations that. spring from our
national conscience. Those who, through no fault of their, own,
must depend on the rest of us--the poverty stricken, the disabled,.
the elderly, all those with true need-can reset assured that the
social safety net of programs they depend on are exempt from any
cuts. (February 18, 1981, p. 110)
A cartoon by the syndicated cartoonist Dan Wasserman is
illustrative. It portrayed David Stockman, Director of the Office

73

America's Health CamFigure.I

Percei of pregnant women rcici'igadequale prenatal care and inahequale
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of Management and Budget (OMB) and the chief architect of
the Reagan budget proposals, in four frames saying, "To simplify the fight over budget cuts," "we're.planning an elirnination tournament.." "The farniers can take on. the elderly, the
jobless vs. the school kids, etc." "The Winner gets to.go one-onone with the Pentagon."
The President clearly brilled at this image of cruelly:
Contrary to some of the wild charges you may hIave hcard, this
administration has not and will not turn it back oil America's.
elderly or America's poor, . ,The entitlement programs that make

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

up our safely net for the truly needy have worthy goals and many
deserving recipients... Don't be fooled by those who proclaim
that spending cuts will deprive (he elderly, the needy, and the
helpless... (January 26, 1982, pp. 74-75)

In 1986, James C. Miller succeeded Stockman at 0MB. Wassermann portrayed a Congressman asking, "Mr. Miller, you call
for cuts in Food Stamps, Medicaid, nutrition and job training."
"How does that square with the President's pledge not to balance the budget. . ." "on the back of' the man who is poor?"
And in the final frame, Miller replied, "Congressman-these cuts
would mostly affect women and children!"
The second proposal to cut costs was to reduce.
the Federal burden for Medicaid by placing a cap on the percentage of
Federal contribution to the program. Congress, under pressure
from the nati0i's governors, modified this proposal to reduce
the percentage of Federal matching to Medicaid. The net effect' was a 5% reducLion in Federal expenditu res for entitlement
programs between 1981 and 1982 (p. 50).
Figure 2 shows the number of Medicaid recipients .and expenditures from 1972 through 1968 and demonstrates two irn."
portant facts.. First, the cuts in numbers of recipients are not
obvious; this is due to the effects of the recession of 1981-82,
with ltcreasing numbers of persons qualifying for Meditaid despite stricter requirements. If not.for the stricter requirements
that moved many women and children from AFDC eligibility,
there would have been a steep increase in AFDC-based recipients during the early 198(s. Second, despite moderations in
the number of recipients, costs continlued to clirb due to the
increasing cost of health care. This 'is particularly evident for
non-AFDC-based recipients, wh6 are mostly comprised of elderly and disabled recipients. The bulk of Medicaid. payments
for this group consists of.hospital and institutional care costs,
which are very expensive.
Creation of the block grants also provided 'the opportunity
to reduce spending. Part of the rationale for block grants was
that greater efficiency and reduced duplication would reduce
wasteful'administrative costs (Omenn, 1982). Yet tle General
Accounting Offi;e (1982) was unable to find evidence that block
grants resulted in cost savings. (This appeared to be due to the
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Figure 2
Medicaid recipicils and paymenIs IyIasis of eiil'ility', Fiscal 1972-88.
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lack of requirements for evaluaLion and accountability by th6
slates.) Reductions in spending authorization varied among hlle
four block grants. Mental health and preventive health services
were reduced by the 25% that had been proposed; the Maternal
and Child Health (MCI-I) Block Grant authorization level in FY
1982 was about 13% below the total (in real dollars) for the
individual categorical programs in fiscal' 1981 (Iglehart 1983).
(See Figure 3.)
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Figure 3
Tille V or MCH Block, Granl Appropriations in numinil and 1967 C.P.AL
adjusted dollars, Fiscal Years 1967-89.
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Successes and Failures of the Reagan Proposals
Reactions to the Reagan Adn'inistration's plans and proposals were swift and generally full of rhetoric. Some feared
polio epidemics (Boston Herald American, February i1,1982)
or "dead baTies" (Boston [-lerald American, Noveniber'25, 1981),
while the Children's Defense Fund called Reagan policies "an
unconditional war on children" (Boston Globe, 1982). Statislics
on child deaths due to Administration policies were widely
quoted (Common Health, 1984).
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More restrained reactions also emerged. Da~is (1981) noted:
This policy represents a profound.shift in direction in the health
sector. It encompasses a far-reaching reexamination of the role of
the federal government in financing health care services, administering direct programs to pronote, preventive and primary care
services, regulating costs in 1he healih sector, sponsoring biomedical behavioral,: and social science research, and supporting the
-training of health professionals. (p. 312)
The Block Grants
Rosenbaum (1983) of the Children's Defense Fund, a highly
effective child advocacy group, noted some positives in the
MCH Block Grant, including some useful guidelines for planning. In fact the MCH programs had always been very loose
with regard 1t regulations, and the Block Grant provided some
improvements. For example, although no regulations were
included to guarantee implementation, ORA 1.981 prohibited
discrimination and contained requirements that addressed the
issue of quality of care.
But neither did. the block grants omne.out of the Coingress in
the way Reagan had originally proposed. Congressioiial committees exercised their influence, and special interest groups
were not about to be pushed- aside. President Reaga-n complained that his plan to consolidate 86 "'duplcative, regulationridden" programsinto block grants had been rejected and criticized (lie legislation (June 19, 1981, p.. 545):
First, many of th& measures that are needed to curb the aitomatic
spending programs have not been .adopted. These reforms would
target programs more directly toward the truly needy while they
help to eliminate waste and abuse.
Unfortunately, 'the House corhmittee has adopLed oi-ly one'third of the savings that these reforms would bring. And the result,
if unchallenged, lwill be $23 billion in additional red ink and inflationary pressure.in the next several years. Doing only one-third
of the job is not good enough.
Secondly, tertain House committees have not yeL reeived Lhe
message of last November that the American peop'le want less
bureaucratic overhead in Washington and les, red tape typing up
State and local..gov4inment.
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Nonetheless, 'ne' year after taking offieu, President Reagan
wouuld report the success of his New Feder'.lisil:
"lii~vlier, after 50 years of taking power aw.iy from the hands of
[lie people in their Slates and local conlintinities, we' have started
relurning power and resources to then (hanu.irv 26, 1982, p. 73).
Not only did Congress not pass the block grants the way
the President wanled; they were not iniplenivided as the President had hoped they would be. States ised a nuimber of tactics
In blunt le effects of 11e block grants. Feldman's (1985) sludy
of the impact of MCI I Block Grant cutls on five states (Texas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and California) and four
large urban areas (Boston, l)eiroit, New York City, and San Antonio) found that states used "carry-over" foods and increased
their own contributions to block grant progriinis to reduce the
imjact of spending cuts. Some states delayed implementing Ihe
block grant mechanism for a year. There was great variability
in cities' abilities to draw on other funds, however. With the
exception of San Antonio, real service reduclions did occur in
maternity and pediatric services. Nathan and I )ooJlittle's (1987)
extensive study of the eff-cls of Reagan's policies on the states
also emphasizes the states' successes in forestalling many effects
of thu cuts. This expansion occurred'through tilt replacement
of Federal funds with stale dollars, new fiscal coping mechanisms, delaying measures, and administralive reform. Some 38
states raised taxes and increased real spending during lhe years
[984-86 (GAO, 1984; Nalhan, 1987). indeed, their study showed
that several states used the increased flexibility in Medicaid to
expand their programs, rather than contracting then.
Perhaps rnost important, however, is that after an initial period of dramatic success, a kind of political blitzkrieg, Congress
reclaimed authority and after 1981, rejected most of the Administration's proposals for further budget cuts and even approved some new domestic spending. Most notable, in 1983,
Congress reacted to lhe st(ip recession of 198 1-82 with an emergency jobs act that added $2.8 billion to dlmiieslic programs,
including many of those cut in earlier years. For example, passage of the bill added $105 million to the original $373 million appropriation to Title V. The FY 84 appropriation had beUn
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$399 million, 35 percent lower than necessary to maintain 198()
service levels (Feldman, 1985). Federal aid outlays stayed about
the same (in real dollars) from 1982 through 198.1, then increased
in 1985. Outlays were below tlhe 1981 levels, but cmsiderably
above what the Reagan Administration had l,1nrLv'd (Nathan
& Doolitlle, 1987).
Aedicaid Reductions
l'resident Reagan's elforls to reduce Medtlaid also were
short-lived Although OBRA 1981 reduced the F-ederal match
for Mediciaid, total Med icaid expenditti re increased each year
betweet 1979 and 1987 (I ieaith Care Financhi Administration,
that removed
1988). (This occurred despite changes in AI.
over half a million recipients from the prog).ram.) Moreover,
while [lie President was wo rking to reduTe Miedicaid, child
health advocates were working to expand the log.,1ra i. In 198.1,
Federal ma,itching levels wvcre returned to the le\els they had
been in 1981 (Children's l)efense Fund, 1984I). Other changes
that year returned Medicai iO many families .i'estoring their
AI:[)( eligibility.
'lhat year also marked the beginning or a s ries of expansions that included (lie (hild Ilealth Asstiraie Program
(CI-tA'). The Children's D~efense Fund called these changes,
which uncupled eligibility fur Medicaid fron categorical propoor
grams such as AFDC, "the biggest victory inCongress -or
children and families inseveral years" (p. I). Oherg (1990) docimnLts how legislation passed each year beg,,innir g in 1984 expanded Medicaid to i'llide women who w'r pr'egnant for
the first time, women in t\vo-parent families, and childrei from
i
permit ted
birth to age five, and then age eight. States w\:ere first
in 1985 lo include individutals up to 100% of (h Federal poverty level, then permitted to iiclude those ul In 185% and in
1988 reqluired to include those uip to 100(% (OBRA 1989 further
mand.Led pregnant women Mnd children wilh family income>
less than 133% poverty.)
Coninmily Health" Center;

A nijor failure of the Reagan plan was the destruction
of Community Health Centers (CHCs), identified early by the
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Administration as an "infrasiructure for a national health svrvice" (Clark, 198,1). Cl ThCbean as part of tihe War on Poverly,
and were designed to address the problem of lack of access to
health care in many areas. Freeman, Kiecol, and Allen's (982)

analysis of a large data set on two surveys in five commtinitles
found that CI-Cs vere the primary source of cart' for many lowincome persons-disp)ropor'Lionately soi for childin. Mor'n iver,
they found C-ICs to reduce the use ifmore exptensive hospital
clinics and emergency rooms and to lower hospilalization Iites.
The Community Health Centers (C:I IC) progralm had been
funded in FY 1981 al $324 million; 815 centers wtre funded to
serve about five million persons who wer :mostly women and
children (Wallace, 1983). Funding for the converled block grant
was $281 million in FY 1982, but was increased to $360 in FY
1983 (Library of Congress, 1984).
WIC
Reagan also wanted to fOlLdh
lhe Special SUppleiental Not ri[ion Program for Women, Infants, and Childrenl (WIC) inlo ile
MCH Block Grant (Rush, '1982; Food Research Action Center
1983), but Congress rejected Iis idea, as well as cuts that would
have reduced funds substantially. (The WIC pro .,ram, ealcted
in 1972, provides certain highly nutritions foods, and nutrilional
counseling, for pregnant and lactating wolen, and yoLIng children. Services are available to low-income wonen and children
who are. deemed to be.at nutritional risk. Allliotgl the evilIation data are mixed (Rush, '1982), most MCI I advocates sipport the program (Paige, V)82).) The Presidenl did manage to
cut other nutrition prograis by about, one third in inflationadjusted dollars (Robbins, 1983).
The VIC prograr was lht soure of a major confrontation
between the President and the health community. The Fod Research and Action Center (BRAG) had released data in 1982 that
it claimed showed increasing infant mortality in many slates
and linking those increases to proposed cuts in the WIC program. There was wide press coverage, and Edward N. Iranidt,
Assistant Secretary fur lealth, ItHFIS, lestified before a St'nate
subcommittee. Although Brandt's testimony mainly consisted of
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clarifying (ih data and 1ion sonic true' methodological shortcomings of the ]RA(' report , this conl rovcr's); mcii'ibuted ti
President's coldt-hCa lied irrag'.
Mhen the political cost. of attempis to Cut WIC b'came too
, Dote
great, the Piresident (with the .11ljport ol Vrra Lor'1s R rIhrt
and Jesse I ltrns) conceded ithe nced for thet program for pre,nant womn and infants bt allten pLed to remove older childil
lruiu the program. Again, the I're ident faiied and V l(' was lNl
relatively unilouched.

Researc/h
Two lealt lh-related areas did receive ite I'resident's support.
"lie first was Federal funding foir research. The only area of ex-

pansion of the Federal health budget. in 1982 was the pr'opo.sed
$168 million for the, National Instit utes of I ttalih (I),vis, 198I).
flow this oc tUrred is not entirety clear, but the Pre.sident's inldulirial and business supporters placed high value (on the nlalion's scientific position (Greent i'rg, 198(0) and Dl-t IS Secretary
Richard S. Schweiker was a vigorous advocate of tit, Nationil
Instilules of I iealth (Iglehart, t983).
During the canpign Reagan had criticized the Carter bldgelt cuts for rescari (Greenbvg,, 1981). The Presitlunt's arln ellilt( of a $100 million increase for hiomedical resea hli
11011
dlring his 1982 State of the Union m ssage was 1t only healihrelated refrnce in the speech (p. 75). In fact, Congres.s al
proved considerably more than (lie Admiinistration rqueslt!d
(e1t, harl 1983).
Yet althigh research fared welt, the related ite if data and
information systens di not do well. Oin of the Carl\. victims of
yrli
W,'V I/
the Adminisl iration's cuts was Ihe MVorbidil 1 and AloNr lf1
Report (IlMWR), a publication from the CI)C. For 21 years, the
MMWR had become a trustod and valued publication, sent fie
Io thousands of official agencies and practicing physicians. As
a budget-saving device, the Administration initiated a very exilwnsive subscription thal had lit, effect of reducil.ri ci rculati n
of the MM\,W dramatically. It is not easy to interpret this event,

By reducing, [he availability of the MMWR the AtLIni nistratloir
undermined the not ion that a Federal agency might b, v:iewed
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as highly effetliv and esseni ial. The effort also fits with(oller
efforts to reduce Federal data systems (Rliman, 1982).
These other efforts include culs innalional health intrviw
surveys, and reductions at the National Cciihr I Health Statistics. It is possible that the Admiistration iiilvnded to limit lhe
availability of Federal information as a nethod of preventing
any links bet ween Federal cut-backs (in biilivct and role) anld
adverse health oucomes for the population . If the infornalion
was not available, (lien critics toold not draw ilie associations.

Medicare
The second health-related area that was the subject

ofI the
Administration's interest concerned catastrophic health care
coverage for the elderly. In contrast to li 'resident's dedication to reducing social services programs and spending. and il
opposition to inany of his usual allies, he ( leclaired his inI'rest in
this program a his 1986 Slate of the Union address. On lIilv I,
1988, Ile signtd lie Medicare- Ualas[rophic Coverage Ad of 19,88
(P.. 100-360). The bill marked the most signifla it expansion of
the Medicare program since, its 1965 inception (Iglehart, lPI).
The program would have expanded Medica'e to includL insurance against Ireatment for major acule illness, and it also
ended the necessity of one spouse's becoming impoverished in
order to entilh, the oiher 1o Medicaid coverage of long L1rm

care. Nevertheless, the program still left maniy gaps in health
care coverage, including lie most important one of long-term
can'.
In the end, however, Ilit hill was rt'l''aled not because
of its many gaps, but because, of the opposition bv the lderly,
whose copayments and prenihms would have financed Most of
th, program. Approxinall'v one-third (if the costs of (lie l _
gram would have come from a fixed monthly premium, while
the rest would have come from an incoii,-relatcd surchariige
paid by approximately one third of the mor' affluent elderly
(L.evitan, 199(1).
IOeregulation
On the goal or deregulation, President Reagan appears to
have been successful. At a news conference in October of I181
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he held tip six pages of block grant regulations and boasted
that they replaced 318 pages of ,-egu latiurs for 57 categorical
prograns that had been replaced by lhe block grants. In his
State of Ih liUnion Address one year afler liking office, President
'
h1of new
Reagan would report: "Togtether, we have cut the growl
Federal rtegulations nearly in -half. In 1981 there were 23,000
fewer pagevs in the Federal Registcr, which lists new regulations,
than Ihere were in 1980" (January 2fi, 1982 p. 73).
Federal involvemeni was reduced under the block grant approach, alth iugh it has hegun to spring back under [lie Bush
years. The (.Ii RA 89 amendments to Title V give the Federal
government renewed authoritV to specify how funds irt spent,
and they require the stales to submit an application for their
block grant funds in a fornat now prescribed ini "guidance"
(not by law or regulatioms).
Abortloln
On abortion, the Pre'sident accomldishd litil Ihal was sub-

stantive. In fact, he probably learned that lie had relatively
few tools with which to influence th, abortion debaite. Ht' did,
however, nominate Dr. C. Everett Koop, a nationally respected
pediatric surgeon from Philadelphia, to I he position of.Surgeon
General of the United States, in parl because oOl KoOp's well
known opposition to abortion. In one of the great ironies of
the administration, Koop became converled to the iblic health
mission, tie campaigned for strong government positions on
smoking and other public health nv,,tres that ny have rankled Republican st, ppoers of the Ireside'int. Fie took .i national
leadership position ol AIDS. And, finally, lie cquivoctled on
the abortion issue.
In 1983, the Administration acted io close down one of
the few explicitly abortiun-related activities of the Federal government, lite Abortion Surveillance Branch at [lhe ('enters for
Disease Control (CDC). The director of that uilit, I)r. Willard
Cates, had carried ot iimirnerous slidies showinlig that .legal
abortion was mich s.ftr for wonte than cither illegal abortion
or, in many cases, pr,'egnantcy itself. "Mls' work was freqely
quoted by prochoice advocales. Dr. (iates was transfirred to the
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CI)C's section on sexually tranismitte d diseases aLiviI "
v.Later in
he Admirtnistration, however, it becairnc evident tn Ilie prolife
lobby that they no longer had an\ dala on .hilch Iomake their
cas that the numnber of abortions Ineig carried turt ill
Ile U.S.
was excessive. In another reversal, the Aborthon Surveillance
Branch was put back to work to revive its annu, l reporls.
Late in the Administration, Surgeon General IK<tp was
asked by the 'Administration to come up with it dilat
that
showed the psychological damage to wvomen of aborlims (July
3), 1987, p. 898). An expert cormlithce was convc'itd ,itthe
CI)C. Their report indicated that there was no scietlific evidence
for such an effect and a large scale study was unwarranted. It
appears that Koop himself was convinced by this finding and
moderated his stance on abortion. Tiv Administration and its
right-to-life constitLuency were said to be furious. 11is likely that
this episode was an important component of the decision of the
new Bush Administration not to reappuint Koop as Surgeon
General in 1989,
President Reagan expressed his sopport for Ili,,
'onstitutioual Abortion Amendment in a Sepitember 8, 1982 Iiter, and
in a speech on Seplember 14 made an istmonishing claiin: "I think
the fact that children have been prerlmalurely born, e\en down
the 3-month stage, and have lived to---ie record slltovs-to
grow up and be nrmral human beings, that ought lo be enough
for all of us" (p. 1151). The bulkc of the President's action on
abortion during his two terms consisled of such rhetoric. -Ie
ofte,n spoke of abortion, nearly always linking it with Ilhe issl. of school prayer, in numelotlS ,s
ljprarances before rteligious
groups such as the National Associalion of Evangelicals (March
8, 1983) and the Nalirnal Religious Broadcasters (j iluary 31,
1983). He regularly offered support for the Hyde Aimendment,
prohibiting Medicaid payments for abortions, and otlher legislation. At a luncheon for membt,rs of a conservalivc I'olitical
Action Committet on February 20, 1987, he said:
L.ast week we sent to Congress lTgisliliom to enact (n a pi'rmanent, government wide basis the I lydt, amendmeni r'L,;rictim on
Fwderal funding of abortion. Our p'oposal would also cut off funding, under lith, ItM, to private (,aiiaitii(ms licit nfr oir
perforl
abortions except when a niothrs: life is in danger (p. 167).
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AIthough tile Presideii was not succt'ssll in passilg a ('onevClie so 1 OLbjeTcstitutional amendmcnll, once again he did i
tives ill the financing lsp ct of aboriti . I lis other sillctt,%;, in
keeping tlh conservalivt, postion before the public, is mor'
difficult to measure bul was certainly not a complete failre.
Subsequent failures in sevr rI, states ht furl her limit accs,; to
abortion would suggest that neither wis his rhetorical ca ilpaign a c,,m plele SuccL'SS,
Suimary: The Legacy
Overall, the legacy of the Reagan Administration on Amwrica's health care delivery system was ,1)l the catastrophic One
that was predicled. The worst of the spendinlg rCdulctions, while
severe, were relatively shorl-lived and partly compensaIt'd [or
by the slates. The most significant cuts occu rretd in 1981; 0VtlI,
there wt.s a 7,, cL1 in -eder,l granis-hi.-aid io state ;lnd loal
governmenits.- 12% in real Ierms (Nathan & )oolittle, 1987). Ill
the cast' if tIhe MCI I Block G rant, a maijr vehicle for d'livery
of services to poor woniii' and children, ihe Reagan culs ooly
continued a trend of erosion of funding. In the case tOf MVdicaid, 1I Reagan efforts were off-set by a powerful advocacy
movement. In fac, the e\pans;ions thal occo rrcd in the mild-lo
late-1981k, and will coilinti' to 2002, are il'ofouL nd and, il lihe
absence of creation of a national health instirlance program, will
provideh health care stciril' for hundred'; of Ihousands of lowincome women and chilirUn.
Yet iln mistake shor lti be made: the effects of the red clI i0:
in speiuding on health care fell mosI dra
i't or,
4 mat ically on Il
and parlicutIlaly on poour women anid chidren. At least ftr a
time, matit'rnily and iiilint services wT're lost. 'ihe Chihliren's
Defense Fund reported in 1983 that in th prtvious 1$ nonths
every stille, had reduced'0
health services for [it! poor (New York
Times, January 17, 1983).
The Children's )efense Fund also reported (New York
Time:s, January 17, 1983) that the reduclion tuf funding for ihe
Community I lealth Centers of 18% In (to $373 million) had resuiled in 725,000 persons being denied services, with 6,4% of
those being children or women of child-bearing age. terlhiii'
many of those services were later restored, btl some damagi
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probiably occurred from [he interruptlion of health c rt expeiienccd by many persons. It is difficult' t0 assess the additive
effects of cuts in Medicaid, which pro\vided acct's; lto
private
sector health cart', aid these other cuts which redu1cedl Iii, availability of-public-sector health care.
Second, it is clear that the Reagan efforts to redtict. Federal authority in favor of the stalevs has resulted in ,,'alti'r state
Ilower (Nathan & Doolitle, 1987). What is not entirce-ly clear is
what that greater state power means for health care fot- the poor.
Althtough liberals have always assutmed slate authority to corresjiind with retrenchieit in social policy and more restrictive
programs and policies, this does not appear to be universally so.
I.arger, more liberal states spent more than more conservative
ones, but most buffered Federal cuts to some extent. Itong-terr
effects on health and welfare programs will be difficult I assess
until the economic recession abalt'.
A more profound impact on Ihli hewalth care delivery system
may be due to the deficit left by eagan's simullaneu., tax cuts
and increases in dhfense spending. \hetn he assumed ilice in
1981, the deficit was $78.9 billion, aild lit, said "this kilid of irrespoinsibility can't go on" (March 2, 1981 p. 177). When President
Reagan left office, it stood at $155 billion (Office of Managemenit and Budget), Nathan and Doofittle (1987) enphasize the
long-lerm -ieaning of the deficit: " . . what is not debatable is
the inhibiting effect of the deficit oil proposals for new federal
programs. The signal from Washington was clear; new social
pgrograil initiatives would have to occu r elsewhere" (p. 13)..
Sonie other Irofound influence,; are more phihoi
iihical.
First, the Reagan Administration clearly reversed il -ommitnient to the "workiing poor" that had beecn evident ini the Carter
Adlinistration. Yet with the Family Support Act of 1988 (which
extended Medicaid eligibility for six months for faiiiilies who
lieve AFDC dut to finding eniptoyioyient) and the mirntloo i:ling
of Medicaid from AFDC, much of Ihai commitment seeimis to
have been recovered.
Second, the Reagiin years conlintire l a pronoiced shift in
conceri and resources away from children and Uovard the elt'rly. 13). 1984, for example, Federal t'xt'enditures pe'r hild were

America's I-hvrtlh Care

only 9% of thl, per capita expenditures for ihe elderly (Preston,
1984). Diring the 1980s, the r'al benefits of Medicaid eligibility
for AFDC children decreased b\v 30% while the benefits for the
elderly increased 10% in il'lalion-adjushd hetrms (Schiesitiger,
1989), The rsults are C'ldaltly demonstrated in increasing. nin-

bets of childlren in poverty, contrasted to dt-creasing nlmIe'rs
of elderly persons. It is difficult to determine exactly how Uli,,
shift has occu rred, but de ographic chang-es, as well as a s 'olig
political lobby on behalf of (Ie elderly, have probably bieen
influenliaI.
In conclusion, there is no coubt that (h Realgan Administration madu a significant impact. upon the American health care
system Soni of the negative impact on low-income mothers and
children 'uaiMitS; muc-0h of it has been ameliorated by status antid
subsequent I:deral action. In ihe long riml , however, the 111,1jor impact of the Reagan Adninistralion ontihe health care of
women and children and lw-income families may hcivu occurred Ihrtlillh the Adninis ration's social aill econolic poli
cies, whichh are discussed it other articles in this issue.
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